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Wanted Person No: 0377-S06 |
Najar Kidnapping |
Sent-Complain Letters |
Published: 14.05.2009 Updated: 14.05.2009 |
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Who Kidnapped me? |
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Information wanted on this person (please
send to NajarWantedPersons@Yahoo.com)
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Name and Aliases |
Bad general-06: David
Howell Petraeus Note: See below what I know
about this person based on the Internet information of Wikipedia. Photos. See also: Bad generals, American military, German
police, American military intelligence agents as members of my household, the American military intelligence secret camp in 1959 in USA that simulated the
city of Damascus, Syria where I was brainwashed in it, Bush family, “Rockefeller Family tree”,
“All Families”, “Rockefeller family members in my life”, American military intelligence agents disguised as
German government members |
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Relation to me |
Under Construction |
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First saw/met |
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Age at that time |
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Hidden biological relatives |
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Allegedly Died On |
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Surrounding me during |
My persecution and brainwash by my fake family that
consisted of some of my biological family members of the Windsor,
Rockefeller, Kennedy and
Bush families that were eager and would do anything to
cover up their real identities in the Middle East, including killing innocent
people. During a period when Siemens AG was
trying hard to get my attention to what my fake
family was actually doing. During a period when the German police was constantly persecuting me to use
me and prove that my fake families are terrorists and drug lords. During a
period when the Americans disguised as German in and around Munich, Germany
such as Unterschleissheim, Hoehenbrunn,
Unterhaching, Baldham and other, were desperate to shut me up in that they
persecuted me and brainwashed me while pretending to be German Christians.
During a period when all of them together were preparing either to kill me or
kidnap me to USA, which they did. During a period when my fake and biological
families persecuted me very viciously after I discovered that they were
printing a fake Quran in cooperation with the Saudi Arabian government at the Clett Verlag in Stuttgart, Germany to implicate
the alleged German Nazis that were allegedly hiding in the Middle East, in
short to implicate the Germans, because Germany was used by USA and England
as scapegoat for all the crimes they were performing in the hidden and
described within this website, such as terrorism, drugs and mass child
kidnapping and molestation to create as many children as quick as possible
that they can brainwash and claim them to be native of the Middle East.
During a persistent period that my fake and biological families tried to link
me to PLO and
Palestinian terrorists. My brainwash, enslaving with the help of the CIA, Mosad, American/English/Syrian military intelligence under their agent whore Najlaa Mahmoud and kidnapping to USA
through the illegal American/English/Syrian military
intelligence project Calypso and in
cooperation with the brainwash and kidnap company UDF
Consulting AG in cooperation with professor
Dr. Fischer alias Ali Bark, Dr. Farzat Baroudi alias professor
Joachim Sauer and Mr. Ruge alias John D. Rockefeller the Third and USA
vice-president and later USA president George H. W.
Bush. Where they kept me letterly as hostage and slave for 15 years in
USA and then dumped me in Holland identity and legal paperless to force me to
live as a refugee with absolute no rights what so ever as cover up for all
the crimes they performed against me and against humanity. |
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Special Crimes Against Me |
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See
more description/Details below the photograph
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Additional photo
needed
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Photo-A01: None |
Photo-B01: None |
Other Descriptions/Details
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Family Members |
Father |
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Mother |
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Sisters |
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Brothers |
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Cousins |
See “Rockefeller Family
tree” |
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Spouse |
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Children |
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Other
Relatives |
See “Rockefeller Family
tree” |
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Biological Family Members |
Father |
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Mother |
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Sisters |
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Brothers |
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Cousins |
See “Rockefeller Family
tree” |
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Spouse |
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Children |
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Other
Relatives |
See “Rockefeller Family
tree” |
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Businesses Partners: |
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Illegal Businesses |
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Will follow |
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Note: All the links below are Wikipedia
links outside these web pages
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David Howell Petraeus |
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Born November 7, 1952 ( (age 56) |
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Allegiance |
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Service/branch |
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Years of service |
1974–present |
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Rank |
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Commands held |
U.S. Central Command |
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Battles/wars |
Operation
Joint Forge (Bosnia) |
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Awards |
Defense Distinguished Service Medal (2) |
General David Howell Petraeus, USA (born November 7, 1952) is the 10th and current Commander, U.S. Central Command. Petraeus previously served as Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) from January 26, 2007 to September 16, 2008.[1] As Commander of MNF-I, Petraeus oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq.[2][3] Petraeus was the General George C. Marshall Award winner as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College—class of 1983.[4] He subsequently earned a M.P.A. degree (1985) and a Ph.D. degree (1987) in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He later served as Assistant Professor of International Relations at the U.S. Military Academy and also completed a fellowship at Georgetown University. He has a BS from the U.S. Military Academy—class of 1974—from which he graduated as a distinguished cadet (top 5% of his class).
Petraeus has garnered numerous accolades in recent years. In 2009, he received the National Defense Industrial Association’s Eisenhower Award, the Office of Strategic Service’s William Donovan Award, the No Greater Sacrifice Freedom Award, the Atlantic Council of the United States’ Military Leadership Award, the Congressional Medal of Honor Society’s Distinguished Citizen Award. In 2008, a poll conducted by Foreign Policy and Prospect magazines selected Petraeus as one of the world's top 100 public intellectuals.[5] Also, the Business Executives for National Security awarded Petraeus their 2008 Eisenhower Award. Also in 2008, the Static Line Association named Petraeus as its 2008 Man of the Year, and Der Spiegel named him "America's most respected soldier."[6] As 2008 came to a close, GQ Magazine (December 2008) named Petraeus as the "Leader of the Year: Right Man, Right Time",[7] Newsweek named him the 16th most powerful person in the world in its December 20, 2008 edition,[8] and Prospect magazine named him the "Public Intellectual of the Year".[9] In 2007, Time named Petraeus one of the 100 most influential leaders and revolutionaries of the year[10] as well as one of its four runners up for Time Person of the Year.[11][12] He was also named the second most influential American conservative by The Daily Telegraph[13] as well as The Daily Telegraph's 2007 Man of the Year.[14][15] In 2005, Petraeus was selected as one of America's top leaders by US News and World Report.[16]
Some news reports have speculated that Petraeus may have interest in running for the presidency. Despite these accounts, Petraeus has categorically stated that he has no political ambitions.[17][18][19][20][21][22]
Early
years
Petraeus was born in Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York,
the son of Miriam (née
Howell) and Sixtus Petraeus. His mother was American and his father was a sea
captain who had immigrated to the United States from the Netherlands
during the initial phase of World
War II.[23]
Sixtus settled in Cornwall-on-Hudson, where David Petraeus grew up and
graduated from Cornwall Central High School
in 1970. Residents called him 'Peaches'
in reference to his often-mispronounced last name[24]
and the nickname stuck with him as a cadet.[25]
Petraeus then went on to the U.S. Military Academy
in nearby West Point.
Petraeus was on the intercollegiate soccer and ski teams, was a cadet captain
on the brigade staff, and was a "distinguished cadet" academically,
graduating in the top 5% of the Class of 1974 (ranked 43rd overall). In the
class yearbook, Petraeus was remembered as "always going for it in sports,
academics, leadership, and even his social life."[26]
Two months after graduation Petraeus
married Holly Knowlton, a graduate from Dickinson
College and daughter of Army General William A. Knowlton
who was superintendent
of the U.S. Military Academy
(West Point) at the time.[27]
They have two grown children, Anne and Stephen.
Petraeus graduated from West
Point in 1974. He earned the General George C. Marshall
Award as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College Class of 1983 at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
He subsequently earned a M.P.A.
in 1985 and a Ph.D.
in international relations
in 1987 from Princeton University's
Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
then served as an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the U.S. Military Academy
from 1985 to 1987. His doctoral dissertation, "The American Military and
the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and
the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era," dealt with the influence of the
Vietnam
War on military thinking regarding the use of force.[28]
He also completed a military fellowship at Georgetown's
School of
Foreign Service in 1994–1995, although he was
called away early to serve in Haiti as the Chief of Operations for the UN force
there in early 1995.
From late 2005 through February
2007,[29]
Petraeus served as Commanding General of Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
(CAC) located there. As commander of CAC, Petraeus was responsible for
oversight of the Command and General Staff College
and seventeen other schools, centers, and training programs as well as for
developing the Army’s doctrinal manuals, training the Army’s
officers, and supervising the Army’s center for the collection and
dissemination of lessons learned. During his time at CAC, Petraeus and Marine Lt.
Gen. James N. Mattis jointly oversaw the publication of Field Manual
3-24, Counterinsurgency, the body of which was written by an
extraordinarily diverse group of military officers, academics, human rights
advocates, and journalists who had been assembled by Petraeus and Mattis.[30][31]
Additionally, at both Fort Leavenworth and throughout the military's schools
and training programs, Petraeus integrated the study of counterinsurgency into
lesson plans and training exercises. In recognition of the fact that soldiers
in Iraq often performed duties far different than those they trained for,
Petraeus also stressed the importance of teaching soldiers how to think as well
as how to fight and the need to foster flexibility and adaptability in leaders,[32][33]
he has been called "the world's leading expert in counter-insurgency
warfare".[34]
Later, having refined his ideas on counterinsurgency based on the
implementation of the new COIN doctrine in Iraq, he published both in Iraq as
well as in the Sep/Oct 2008 edition of Military
Review his "Commander's
Counterinsurgency Guidance" to help guide leaders and units in the
Multi-National Force-Iraq.[35]
Upon his graduation from West Point
in 1974, Petraeus was commissioned an infantry officer. After completing Ranger
School (Distinguished Honor Graduate and other honors), Petraeus
was assigned to the 509th Airborne Battalion Combat Team,
a light infantry unit in Vicenza, Italy.
Ever since, light infantry has been at the core of his career, punctuated by
assignments to mechanized units,
unit commands, staff assignments, and educational institutions. After leaving
the 509th as a first lieutenant,
Petraeus began a brief association with mechanized units when he became
assistant operations officer on the staff of the 2nd Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
at Fort Stewart,
Georgia.
In 1979, he assumed command of a company
in the same division: Company A, 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry Regiment
(Mechanized), and then served as that battalion's operations officer, a major's
position that he held as a junior captain. In 1988–1989, he also served
as operations officer to the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)'s 1st
Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized)
and its 1st Brigade.
In 1981, Petraeus became aide-de-camp
to the Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized).[36]
He spent the next few years furthering his military and civilian education,
including spending 1982-83 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 1983-85 at Princeton;
and 1985-87 at West Point. After earning his Ph.D. and teaching at West Point,
Petraeus continued up the rungs of the command ladder, serving as military
assistant to Gen. John Galvin,
the Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe. From there, he moved to the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)
and then to a post as aide and assistant executive officer to the U.S. Army
Chief of Staff, Gen. Carl Vuono,
in Washington, D.C.
Upon promotion to lieutenant colonel,
Petraeus moved from the office of the Chief of Staff to Fort
Campbell, Kentucky,
where he commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)'s 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment
from 1991–1993. As battalion commander of the Iron
Rakkasans, he suffered one of the more
dramatic incidents in his career when, in 1991, he was accidentally shot in the
chest during a live-fire exercise
when a soldier tripped and his rifle discharged. He was taken to Vanderbilt University Medical Center,
Nashville,
Tennessee,
where he was operated on by future U.S. Senator
Bill
Frist. The hospital released him early after he did fifty push
ups without resting, just a few days after the accident.[37][38]
During 1993–94, Petraeus
continued his long association with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
as the division's Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (plans, operations and
training) and installation Director of Plans, Training, and Mobilization
(DPTM). In 1995, he was assigned to the United
Nations Mission in Haiti
Military Staff as its Chief Operations Officer during Operation Uphold Democracy.
His next command, from 1995–97, was the 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division,
centered on the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment.
At that post, his brigade's training cycle at Fort
Polk's Joint Readiness Training Center for low-intensity warfare was
chronicled by novelist and military enthusiast Tom
Clancy in his book Airborne.
From 1997-99 Petraeus served in the Pentagon as Executive Assistant to the
Director of the Joint Staff and then to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Henry
Shelton, who described Petraeus as "a
high-energy individual who likes to lead from the front, in any field he is
going into."[39]
In 1999, as a brigadier general,
Petraeus returned to the 82nd, serving as the assistant division commander for
operations and then, briefly, as acting commanding general. During his time
with the 82nd, he deployed to Kuwait
as part of Operation Desert Spring,
the continuous rotation of combat forces through Kuwait during the decade after
the Gulf
War.
From the 82nd, he moved on to serve
as Chief of Staff of XVIII Airborne Corps
at Fort Bragg
during 2000–2001. In 2000, Petraeus suffered his second major injury,
when, during a civilian skydiving jump, his parachute collapsed at
low altitude due to a hook turn, resulting in a hard landing that broke his
pelvis. He was selected for promotion to Major General
in 2001.[40]
During 2001–2002, as a brigadier general, Petraeus served a ten-month
tour in Bosnia and Herzegovina
as part of Operation Joint Forge.
In Bosnia, he was the NATO Stabilization
Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations as well as the
Deputy Commander of the U.S. Joint Interagency Counter-Terrorism Task Force, a
command created after the September 11 attacks
to add counterterrorism capability to the U.S. forces attached to the NATO
command in Bosnia. In 2004, he was promoted to Lieutenant General.[41]
In 2007, he was promoted to General.[42]
On April 23, 2008, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that President Bush was
nominating General Petraeus to command U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM),
headquartered in Tampa, FL. This nomination requires Senate confirmation.[43]
Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus (right),
commanding general, 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault) looks on as Lt. Gen.
William S. Wallace, V Corps commanding general speaks to soldiers, March 21,
2003, Kuwait.
In 2003,
Petraeus, then a Major General, saw combat for the first time when he commanded
the 101st Airborne Division during V Corps's
drive to Baghdad.
In a campaign chronicled in detail by Pulitzer
Prize-winning author Rick
Atkinson of The Washington Post
in the book In the Company of Soldiers, Petraeus led his division
through fierce fighting south of Baghdad,
in Karbala,
Hilla,
and Najaf.
Following the fall of Baghdad, the division conducted the longest
heliborne assault
on record in order to reach Ninawa Province,
where it would spend much of 2003.
The 1st Brigade was responsible for the area south of Mosul,
the 2nd Brigade for the city itself, and the 3rd Brigade for the region
stretching toward the Syrian border. An often-repeated story of
Petraeus's time with the 101st is his asking of embedded
Washington Post
reporter
Rick Atkinson
to "Tell me how this ends,"[44]
an anecdote he and other journalists have used to portray Petraeus as an early
recognizer of the difficulties that would follow the fall of Baghdad.[45][46][47][48][49][50]
In Mosul,
a city of nearly two million people, Petraeus and the 101st employed classic
counterinsurgency methods to build security and stability, including conducting
targeted kinetic operations and using force judiciously, jump-starting the
economy, building local security forces, staging elections for the city council
within weeks of their arrival, overseeing a program of public
works, reinvigorating the political process, [51][52][53]
and launching 4,500 reconstruction projects.[54]
This approach can be attributed to Petraeus, who had been steeped in
nation-building during his previous tours in places like Bosnia and Haiti and
thus approached nation-building as a central military mission and who was
"prepared to act while the civilian authority in Baghdad was still getting
organized," according to Michael Gordon of The New York Times.[55]
Some Iraqis gave Petraeus the nickname 'King
David',[51][56]
which was later adopted by some of his colleagues.[57][58][59]
Newsweek
has stated that "It's widely accepted that no force worked harder to win
Iraqi hearts and minds than the 101st Air Assault Division led by
Petraeus."[60]
One of the General's major public
works was the restoration and re-opening of the University of Mosul.[61][62][63]
Petraeus strongly supported the use of commanders' discretionary funds for
public works, telling Coalition Provisional Authority
director
L. Paul Bremer
"Money is ammunition" during the director's first visit to Mosul.[64][65]
Petraeus' often repeated[66][67][68][69]
catchphrase[70]
was later incorporated into official military briefings[71][72]
and was also eventually incorporated into the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field
Manual drafted with Petraeus's oversight.[73]
In February 2004, the 101st was
replaced in Mosul by a unit roughly one quarter its size - a Stryker
brigade. The following summer, the Governor of Nineveh Province was
assassinated and most of the Sunni Arab Provincial Council members walked out
in the ensuing selection of the new governor, leaving Kurdish members in charge
of a predominantly Sunni Arab province. Later that year, the local police
commander defected to the Kurdish Minister of Interior in Irbil after repeated
assassination attempts against him, attacks on his house, and the kidnapping of
his sister. The largely Sunni Arab
police collapsed under insurgent attacks launched at the same time Coalition
Forces attacked Fallujah in November 2004.
There are differing explanations for
the apparent collapse of the police force in Mosul. The
Guardian quoted an anonymous US diplomat
saying "Mosul basically collapsed after he [Petraeus] left".[74]
Former diplomat Peter Galbraith,
a paid adviser to the Kurdish Regional Government,[75]
criticized Petraeus's command of the 101st, saying his achievements have been
exaggerated and his reputation is inflated.[76]
He wrote for The New York Review of Books
that "Petraeus ignored warnings from America's Kurdish
allies that he was appointing the wrong people to key positions in Mosul's
local government and police."[77]
On the other hand, in the book Fiasco, Washington
Post reporter Tom Ricks wrote that
"Mosul was quiet while he (Petraeus) was there, and likely would have
remained so had his successor had as many troops as he had--and as much
understanding of counterinsurgency techniques." Ricks went on to note that
"the population-oriented approach Petraeus took in Mosul in 2003 would be
the one the entire U.S. Army in Iraq was trying to adopt in 2006."[78]
Time
columnist Joe Klein
largely agreed with Ricks, writing that the Stryker
brigade that replaced the 101st "didn't do any of the local governance
that Petraeus had done." Moving away from counterinsurgency principles,
"they were occupiers, not builders."[79]
New York Times
reporter Michael Gordon and retired General Bernard Trainor echoed Ricks and
Klein, including in their book Cobra II a quote that Petraeus "did
it right and won over Mosul."[80]
Multi-National
Security Transition Command - Iraq
In June 2004, less than six months
after the 101st returned to the U.S., Petraeus was promoted to lieutenant
general and became the first commander of the Multi-National
Security Transition Command Iraq. This newly-created command had
responsibility for training, equipping, and mentoring Iraq's growing Army,
Police, and other security forces as well as developing Iraq's security
institutions and building associated infrastructure, such as training bases,
police stations, and border forts. During Petraeus's fifteen months at the helm
of MNSTC-I, he stood up a three-star command virtually from scratch and in the
midst of serious fighting in places like Fallujah, Mosul, and Najaf. By the end
of his command, some 100,000 Iraqi Security Forces had been trained; Iraqi Army
and Police were being employed in combat; countless reconstruction projects had
been executed; and hundreds of thousands of weapons, body armor, and other
equipment had been distributed in what was described as the "largest
military procurement and distribution effort since World War II," at a
cost of over $11 billion.[81]
In September
2004, Petraeus wrote an article for The Washington Post
in which he described the tangible progress being made in building Iraq's
security forces from the ground up while also noting the many challenges
associated with doing so. "Although there have been reverses -- not to
mention horrific terrorist attacks," Petraeus wrote, "there has been
progress in the effort to enable Iraqis to shoulder more of the load for their
own security, something they are keen to do."[82]
Some of the challenges involved in building security forces had to do with
accomplishing this task in the midst of a tough insurgency—or, as
Petraeus wrote, "making the mission akin to repairing an aircraft while in
flight -- and while being shot at." Other challenges included allegations
of corruption as well as efforts to improve Iraq's supply accountability
procedures. For example, according to former Interim Iraq Governing Council
member Ali A. Allawi
in The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace,
"under the very noses of the security transition command, officials both
inside and outside the ministry of defense were planning to embezzle
most, if not all, of the procurement budget of the army."[83]
The Washington Post
stated in August 2007
that the Pentagon
had lost track of approximately 30% of weapons supplied to the Iraqi security
forces. The General Accounting Office
said that the weapons distribution was haphazard, rushed, and did not follow
established procedures—particularly from 2004
to 2005,
when security training was led by Petraeus and Iraq's security forces began to
see combat in places like Najaf and Samarra.[84][85]
Over a hundred thousand AK-47 assault
rifles and pistols were delivered to Iraqi forces
without full documentation, and some of the missing weapons may have been
abducted by Iraqi insurgents.[86][87]
Thousands of body armour
pieces have also been lost.[88]
The Independent
has stated that the military believed "the situation on the ground was so
urgent, and the agency responsible for recording the transfers of arms so short
staffed, that field commanders had little choice in the matter."[89]
The Pentagon conducted its own investigation, and accountability was
subsequently regained for many of the weapons.[90]
Following his second tour in Iraq,
Petraeus authored a widely-read article in Military Review, listing
fourteen observations he had made during two tours in Iraq, including: do not
do too much with your own hands, money is ammunition, increasing the number of
stakeholders is critical to success, success in a counterinsurgency requires
more than just military operations, ultimate success depends on local leaders,
there is no substitute for flexible and adaptable leaders, and, finally, a
leader's most important task is to set the right tone.[91]
Multi-National Force - Iraq (Spring
2007)
The commanding general of the 9th
Iraqi Army Division, right, speaks with a journalist from the Al-Arabiyah news
channel, left, as they walk with U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus, center, the
commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, through the Al Shurja market in the
Rusafa area of East Baghdad, Iraq, March 11, 2007.
In January 2007, as part of his
overhauled Iraq strategy, President George
W. Bush announced that Petraeus would
succeed Gen. George Casey
as commanding general of MNF-I to lead all U.S. troops in Iraq. On January
23, the Senate Armed Services Committee
held Petraeus's nomination hearing, during which he testified on his ideas for
Iraq, particularly the strategy underpinning the "surge"
of forces. During his opening statement, Petraeus stated that "security of
the population, especially in Baghdad, and in partnership with the Iraqi
Security Forces, will be the focus of the military effort." He went on to
state that security will require establishing a persistent presence, especially
in Iraq's most threatened neighborhoods. He also noted the critical importance
of helping Iraq increase its governmental capacity, develop employment
programs, and improve daily life for its citizens.[92]
Throughout Petraeus's tenure in
Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq
endeavored to work with the Government of Iraq to carry out this strategy that
focuses on securing the population. Doing so required establishing—and
maintaining—persistent presence by living among the population,
separating reconcilable Iraqis from irreconcilable enemies, relentlessly
pursuing the enemy, taking back sanctuaries and then holding areas that have
been cleared, and continuing to develop Iraq's security forces and to support
local security forces, often called Sons of Iraq, and to integrate them into
the Iraqi Army and Police and other employment programs.[93][94][95]
The strategy underpinning the
"surge" of forces, as well as the ideas Petraeus included in FM 3-24,
have been referred to by some journalists and politicians as the "Petraeus
Doctrine," although the surge itself was proposed a few months before
Petraeus took command. Despite the misgivings of most Democratic and a few
Republican senators over the proposed implementation of the "Petraeus
Doctrine" in Iraq, specifically regarding the troop surge, Petraeus was
unanimously confirmed as a four-star general and MNF-I commander on January
27.[96][97]
Before leaving for Iraq, Petraeus
recruited a number of highly educated military officers, nicknamed
"Petraeus guys" or "designated thinkers," to advise him as
commander, including Col. Mike Meese, head of the Social Sciences Department at
West Point and Col. H.R. McMaster,
famous for his leadership at the Battle of 73 Easting
in the Gulf War and in the pacification of Tal
Afar more recently, as well as for his doctoral dissertation on
Vietnam-era civil-military relations entitled Dereliction of Duty.
While most of Petraeus's closest advisers are American military officers, he
also hired Lt. Col. David
Kilcullen of the Australian
Army, who was working for the US State Department.[98].
Kilcullen upon his return from Iraq and based on his experiences has recently
published, The Accidental Guerrilla, [99]
and recently discusses the central front of the war and lessons learned in
Iraq, the father of the surge and other topics with the The Washington Post
[100].
U.S. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus,
the commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, briefs reporters at the Pentagon
April 26, 2007, on his view of the current military situation in Iraq.
After taking command of MNF-I on February
10, 2007, Petraeus inspected U.S. and Iraqi
units all over Iraq, visiting outposts in greater Baghdad,
Tikrit,
Baquba,
Ramadi,
Mosul,
Kirkuk,
Bayji,
Samarra,
Basrah
and as far west as al-Hit and Al Qaim. In April 2007, Petraeus made his first
visit to Washington as MNF-I Commander, reporting to President Bush and
Congress on the progress of the "surge" and the overall situation in
Iraq. During this visit he met privately with members of Congress and
reportedly argued against setting a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal from
Iraq.[101]
By late May 2007, Congress did not
impose any timetables in war funding legislation for troop withdrawal.[102]
The enacted legislation did mandate that Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan
Crocker, deliver a report to Congress by
September 15, 2007, detailing their assessment of the military, economic and
political situation of Iraq.
In June 2007, Petraeus stated in an
interview that there were “astonishing signs of normalcy” in
Baghdad, and this comment drew criticism from Senate majority leader Harry
Reid. In the same interview, however, Petraeus stated that
"many problems remain" and he noted the need to help the Iraqis
"stitch back together the fabric of society that was torn during the
height of sectarian violence" in late 2006.[103][104]
Petraeus also warned that he expected that the situation in Iraq would require
the continued deployment of the elevated troop level of more than 150,000 beyond
September 2007; he also stated that U.S. involvement in Iraq could last years
afterward.[105]
These statements are representative of the fact that throughout their time in
Iraq, Petraeus and Crocker remained circumspect and refused to classify
themselves as optimists or pessimists, noting, instead, that they were realists
and that the reality in Iraq was very hard. They also repeatedly emphasized the
importance of forthright reports and an unvarnished approach.[106][107]
Multi-National Force - Iraq (Summer
and Fall 2007)
In July
2007, the White
House submitted to Congress the interim report on Iraq,
which stated that coalition forces had made satisfactory progress on 6 of 18
benchmarks set by Congress. On September
7, 2007, in a letter addressed to the
troops he was commanding, Petraeus wrote that much military progress had been
made, but that the national level political progress that was hoped for had not
been achieved.[108]
Petraeus' Report to
Congress on the Situation in Iraq on Iraq was delivered to Congress
on September 10,
2007.
On August
15, 2007, The Los Angeles Times
stated that, according to unnamed administration officials,
the report "would actually be written by the White House,
with inputs from officials throughout the government."[109]
However, Petraeus declared in his testimony to Congress that "I wrote this
testimony myself." He further elaborated that his testimony to Congress
"has not been cleared by, nor shared with, anyone in the Pentagon, the
White House, or Congress."[110][111]
In his September Congressional
testimony, Petraeus stated that "As a bottom line up front, the military
objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met." He cited
numerous factors for this progress, to include the fact that Coalition and
Iraqi Forces had dealt significant blows to Al-Qaeda Iraq and had disrupted
Shia militias, that ethno-sectarian violence had been reduced, and that the
tribal rejection of Al-Qaeda had spread from Anbar Province to numerous other
locations across Iraq. Based on this progress and additional progress expected
to be achieved, Petraeus recommended drawing down the surge forces from Iraq
and gradually transitioning increased responsibilities to Iraqi Forces, as
their capabilities and conditions on the ground permitted.[112]
Democratic
Senate
Majority Leader Harry
Reid of Nevada argued Petraeus' "plan is just
more of the same" and "is neither a drawdown or a change in mission
that we need." Democratic Representative
Robert Wexler
of Florida
accused Petraeus of "cherry-picking
statistics" and "massaging information".[113]
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Tom
Lantos of California called the General and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Ryan
Crocker "Two of our nation's most
capable public servants"
and said Democrats feel "esteem for their professionalism."
He also said that "We can no longer take their assertions on Iraq at face
value"; concluding, "We need to get out of Iraq, for
that country's sake as well as our own."[114]
Republican
Presidential
candidate Duncan
Hunter called the report "a candid, independent assessment
given with integrity".[115]
Republican Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona
stated that "I commend General Petraeus for his honest and forthright
assessment of the situation in Iraq."[116]
Anti-war
Republican Senator Chuck Hagel
of Nebraska
criticized the report while praising Petraeus, saying "It's not your
fault, general... It's not Ambassador
Crocker's
fault. It's this administration's fault."[117]
A USA
Today/Gallup
poll taken after Petraeus' report to Congress showed virtually
no change in public opinion toward the war.[118]
A Pew Research Center
survey found that most Americans who have heard about the report approve of
Petraeus' recommendations.[119]
On September
20, the Senate passed an amendment by Republican John
Cornyn III of Texas
designed to "strongly condemn personal attacks on the honor and integrity
of General Petraeus". Cornyn drafted the amendment in response to a controversial full-page ad
by the liberal group Moveon.org in the September
10, 2007 edition of The New York Times.
All forty-nine Republican Senators and twenty-two Democratic Senators voted in
support.[120]
The House passed a similar resolution by a 341-79 vote on September 26.[121]
In December 2007, The Washington Post's
"Fact
Checker" stated that "While some of
Petraeus's statistics are open to challenge, his claims about a general
reduction in violence have been borne out over subsequent months. It now looks
as if Petraeus was broadly right on this issue at least".[122]
Based on the conditions on the
ground, in October 2007, Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Ryan
Crocker revised their campaign plan for Iraq.
In recognition of the progress made against Al Qaeda Iraq, one of the major
points would be "shifting the U.S. military effort to focus more on
countering Shiite militias".[123]
Multi-National
Force - Iraq (Spring 2008)
On February 18, 2008, USA
Today stated that "the U.S. effort
has shown more success" and that, after the number of troops reached its
peak in fall 2007, "U.S. deaths were at their lowest levels since the 2003
invasion, civilian casualties were down, and street life was resuming in
Baghdad."[124]
In light of the significant reduction in violence and as the surge brigades
began to redeploy without replacement, Petraeus characterized the progress as
tenuous, fragile, and reversible and repeatedly reminded all involved that much
work remains to be done.[125][126]
During an early February trip to Iraq, Defense Secretary Robert
Gates endorsed the idea of a period of consolidation and
evaluation upon completion of the withdrawal of surge brigades from Iraq.[127]
Petraeus and Crocker continued these
themes at their two full days of testimony before Congress on April 8 and 9th.
During his opening statement, Petraeus stated that "there has been
significant but uneven security progress in Iraq," while also noting that
"the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and that
innumerable challenges remain" and that "the progress made since last
spring is fragile and reversible." He also recommended a continuation of
the drawdown of surge forces as well as a 45-day period of consolidation and
evaluation after the final surge brigade has redeployed in late July.[128]
Analysts for USA Today
and The New York Times
stated that the hearings "lacked the suspense of last September's
debate," but they did include sharp questioning as well as both skepticism
and praise from various Congressional leaders.[129][130]
In late May 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee
held nomination hearings for Petraeus and Lieutenant General Ray Odierno
to lead United
States Central Command and Multi-National Force-Iraq,
respectively. During the hearings, Committee Chairman Carl
Levin praised these two men, stating that "we owe Gen.
Petraeus and Gen. Odierno a debt of gratitude for the commitment, determination
and strength that they brought to their areas of responsibility. And regardless
of how long the administration may choose to remain engaged in the strife in
that country, our troops are better off with the leadership these two
distinguished soldiers provide."[131]
During his opening statement, Petraeus discussed four principles that would
guide his efforts if confirmed as CENTCOM
Commander: seeking to strengthen international partnerships; taking a
"whole of government" approach; pursuing comprehensive efforts and
solutions; and, finally, both supporting efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and
ensuring readiness for possible contingency operations in the future. Petraeus
also noted that during the week before his testimony, the number of security
incidents in Iraq was the lowest in over four years.[132]
After Petraeus's returned to Baghdad, and despite the continued drawdown of
surge forces as well as recent Iraqi-led operations in places like Basrah,
Mosul, and Baghdad, the number of security incidents in Iraq remained at their
lowest level in over four years.[133]
Multi-National
Force - Iraq (Summer and Fall 2008)
In September 2008, Petraeus gave an
interview to BBC News stating that he did not think using
the term "victory" in describing the Iraq war was appropriate, saying
"This is not the sort of struggle where you take a hill, plant the flag
and go home to a victory parade... it's not war with a simple slogan."[134]
Petraeus had discussed the term
'victory' before in March 2008, saying to NPR
News that "an Iraq that is at peace with itself, at peace
with its neighbors, that has a government that is representative of — and
responsive to — its citizenry and is a contributing member of the global
community" could arguably be called 'victory'.[135]
On the eve of his change of command, in September 2008, Petraeus stated that
"I don't use terms like victory or defeat... I'm a realist, not an
optimist or a pessimist. And the reality is that there has been significant
progress but there are still serious challenges."[136]
Change of Command
Iraq Defense Minister Abdul Qadir
presents a gift to Petraeus during a farewell ceremony in Baghdad on September
15, 2008.
On September 16, 2008, Petraeus
formally gave over his command in Iraq to General Raymond T. Odierno
in a government ceremony presided by Defense Secretary Robert
Gates.[136]
During the ceremony, Gates stated that Petraeus "played a historic
role" and created the "translation of a great strategy into a great
success in very difficult circumstances". Gates also told Petraeus he
believed "history will regard you as one of our nation's greatest battle
captains."[136]
He presented Petraeus with the Defense Distinguished Service Medal.[136]
At the event, Petraeus mentioned the difficulty in getting the Sons
of Iraq absorbed in the central Government of Iraq
and warned about future consequences if the effort stalls.[136]
Indeed, when speaking of these and other challenges, Petraeus is the first to
note that "the gains [achieved in Iraq] are tenuous and unlikely to
survive without an American effort that outlasts his tenure." Even so, as
Petraeus departed Iraq, it was clear to all that he was leaving a much
different Iraq than the one that existed when he took command in February 2007.
As described by Dexter Filkins, "violence has plummeted from its
apocalyptic peaks, Iraqi leaders are asserting themselves, and streets that
once seemed dead are flourishing with life."[137]
This is also illustrated by the Iraq Trends charts that the MNF-I produces
weekly. The January 3, 2009, Iraq Trends Chart [8]
clearly depicts over time, the increases in incidents followed by the sharp
decline as described by Dexter Filkens and others.
U.S.
Central Command (Fall 2008 to present)
On October 31, 2008, Petraeus
assumed command of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) headquartered
in Tampa, Florida. Petraeus is now responsible for US operations in 20
countries spreading from Egypt to Pakistan–including Operations Iraqi
Freedom and Enduring Freedom.
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Gold
Award of the Iraqi Order of the Date Palm
French
Military Campaign Medal
Non-U.S.
service medals and ribbons
United Nations Mission in Haiti
(UNMIH) Medal[139]
NATO Meritorious Service Medal
NATO
Medal for Yugoslavia
(with Service Star)
- British
Parachutist Badge
- French
Parachutist Badge (French:
Brevet de
Parachutisme militaire)
- German
Parachutist Badge (German: Fallschirmspringerabzeichen)
- Lorenz,
G.C.; Willbanks, James H.; Petraeus, David H.; Stuart, Paul A.;
Crittenden, Burr L.; George, Dewey P. (1983),
Operation Junction City, Vietnam 1967 : battle book, Ft. Leavenworth, KS:
United States Army
Command and General Staff
College, Combat Studies Institute, DTIC
ADA139612,
LCC
DS557.7
.O63 1987, OCLC
15637627
- Petraeus,
David H. (1983). "What is Wrong with a Nuclear Freeze," Military
Review v.63:49-64, November, 1983.
- Petraeus,
David H. (1984). "Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexiblity and
Conventional Deterrence," Military Review v.64:33-55, December, 1984.
- Petraeus,
David H. (1985),
"Review of Richard A. Gabriel's The Antagonists: A Comparative
Combat Assessment of the Soviet and American Soldier", Military
Affairs (Lexington,
VA: Society for Military History)
49 (1): 17–22, January
1985, doi:10.2307/1988272,
LCC
E181
.A5 v.49 1985, OCLC
37032240
- Petraeus,
David H. (1986), "Lessons of history and lessons of Vietnam",
Parameters (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College) 16(3): 43-53, Autumn 1986.
- Petraeus,
David H. (1987),
The American military and the lessons of Vietnam : a study of
military influence and the use of force in the post-Vietnam era, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University,
OCLC
20673428.
- Clark,
Asa A., Kaufman, Daniel J., and Petraeus, David H. (1987). “Why an
Army?” Army Magazine v38(2)26-34, February 1987.
- Petraeus,
David H. (1987). “El Salvador and the Vietnam Analogy,” Armed
Force Journal International, February 1987.
- Taylor,
William J., Jr.; Petraeus, David H. (1987),
"The legacy of Vietnam for the U.S. military", in Osborn, George
K., Democracy, strategy, and Vietnam : implications for American
policymaking, Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books,
LCC
E876
.D46 1987, ISBN
9780669163407, OCLC
15518468
- Petraeus,
David H. (1987),
"Korea, the Never-Again Club, and Indochina", Parameters
(Carlisle, PA:
U.S. Army War College)
17 (4): 59–70, December
1987, SuDoc No. D 101.72:17/4, GPO Item
No. 0325-K, PURL
LPS1511,
ISSN
0031-1723,
OCLC
1039883.
- Golden,
James R.; Kaufman, Daniel J.; Clark, Asa A.; Petraeus, David H.
(Eds)(1989),"NATO at Forty: Change Continuity, & Prospects".
Westview Pr.
- Petraeus,
David H. (1989),
"Military
Influence And the Post-Vietnam Use of Force",
Armed Forces & Society
(Piscataway, NJ:
SAGE Publications)
15 (4): 489–505, Summer
1989,
doi:10.1177/0095327X8901500402,
OCLC
49621350,
http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/15/4/489,
retrieved on 26 August 2007.
- Petraeus,
David H.; Carr, Damian P.; Abercrombie, John C. (1997),
"Why
We Need FISTs—Never Send a Man When You Can Send a Bullet"
(PDF), Field Artillery (Fort
Sill, OK: US
Army Field Artillery School) 1997 (3): 3–5,
May-June 1997,
HQDA PB6-97-3, USPS 309-010, PURL
LPS13201,
SuDoc No. D 101.77/2: 1997/3, ISSN
0899-2525,
OCLC
16516511,
http://sill-www.army.mil/FAMAG/1997/MAY_JUN_1997/MAY_JUN_1997_PAGES_3_5.pdf,
retrieved on 26 August 2007.
- (2004)
"Lessons of the Iraq War and Its Aftermath" [9],
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- (2006)
"Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in
Iraq," Military Review [10]
- (2007)
The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
(Forward)"FM-3-24" [11]
- (2007)
"Beyond the Cloister," The American Interest Magazine [12]
- Petraeus,
David H. (2007),
"Iraq:
Progress in the Face of Challenge", Army Magazine (Arlington,
VA: Association of the US Army)
57 (10): 115–123, October 2007,
http://www3.ausa.org/Webpub/DeptGreenBook.nsf/byid/WEBP-77GMHX/$File/Petraeus.pdf?OpenElement.
- Petraeus,
David H. (2008),
"Iraq:
Building on Progress", Army Magazine (Arlington,
VA: Association of the US Army)
58 (10): 109–123, October 2008,
http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/armyarchive/October2008/Documents/Petraeus.pdf.
- (2008)
"Multi-National Force - Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency
Guidance," Military Review [13]
- "The
Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan," 45th Munich
Security Conference, February 8, 2009 [14]
- "The
Emerging Regional Security Network," US-Islamic World Forum, February
14, 2009 [15]
- "The
Foreign Policy Interview with Gen. David H. Petraeus,"
January/Febuary 2009, [16]